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It is recognized that aﬃrmative action, as anti-discriminatory policies whose aim
is to beneﬁt an underrepresented group, is a key driver of progress for women. How-
ever, the role of migrants in helping female voice from abroad has not been addressed
yet. This paper empirically investigates the eﬀect of international migration on the
parliamentary participation of women left behind following the brand new strand of
literature on ‘transfers of norms’. Panel data from 1960 to 2000 allows us to take into
account selection due to women’s eligibility, observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
After having controlled for traditional political and non political factors, we show
that total international migration to countries with higher female political empow-
erment signiﬁcantly increases the female parliamentary shares in sending countries.
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1‘Let us not forget that progress for women is progress for all’
(Mr Koïchiro Matsuura1)
1 Introduction
Is international migration promoting women’s empowerment at origin through the change
in female parliamentary participation? This is the issue we empirically investigate in this
paper following the new strand of literature on ‘transfers of norms’ (Spilimbergo, 2009;
Beine, Docquier and Schiﬀ, 2008; Fargues, 2007).
Sociological research shows that migrants progressively assimilate in terms of cultural
choices (Gordon, 1964)2 or they, at least, come into contact with destinations’ new val-
ues. Political socialization is likely to occur and migrants are willing to accommodate
themselves to new political practices.3 At the same time, they remain attached to their
country of origin (Boyd, 1989). We presume that if migrants become aware of the fact
that political conditions at origin are worse than those they experience at destination,
they may be willing to foster some political changes there (Guarnizo, Haller and Portes,
2003). The possible channels through which migrants can aﬀect the political environment
of origin countries are media coverage, capacity building activities, as well as return and
circular migration.
There is evidence that diaspora individuals contribute to the propagation of political
values. The so called HTA (Home Town Associations) and OSIM (Organisations de
Solidarité Internationale de Migrants) are, for example, immigrant organizations based
on a common hometown, typically informal and voluntary groups, that bring members
together for social, cultural, political empowerment and economic development goals. The
literature refers to ‘Diasporas for Development’, for describing their economic, scientiﬁc
and political achievements.4 The Centro Romero is an HTA made up of Latino migrants
1Director-General of UNESCO on the occasion of the 2008’s International Women’s Day.
2Even if family experience may sometimes prevent from total assimilation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2006).
3Correa (1998) shows, for example, how many Puerto Rican women based in New York came into
politics through community organizations and mediating institutions between government and Puerto
Rican migrants. In this way, women’s social role began to change (‘in Latin America men were always
the leaders. Women in politics were seen as strange’, p. 343) and husbands were more and more convinced
to accept their wives’ new roles and commitments. Thus, when Nydia Velasquez won the primary and
went on to be elected the ﬁrst Puerto Rican congresswoman, she was strongly supported by Latino voters
willing to accommodate themselves to the idea of female leadership.
4See Ionescu (2005) as well as the recent issue of the Economist titled ‘The magic of Diasporas’, 19
2set up in 1984 and operating in Chicago that, among other activities, oﬀers women’s
empowerment projects. In particular, under the so called Women Leadership Project, they
organize workshops, trainings, activities and community events to increase the leadership
potential of the Latinas.5 On the same wavelength, the Initiatives de Femmes Africaines
de France et d’Europe (IFAFE) is an OSIM funded in 1993 which pursues, among others,
home country development objectives linked to female political empowerment.6
Similarly, the South Sudan Women’s Empowerment Network (SSWEN), created by Su-
danese United States-based migrants, has been deeply involved in building the new South
Sudanese nation state whose independence dates back to the 9th of July 2011. The SS-
WEN organized, funded and participated in large conferences, meetings and projects on
women’s political participation. The role of the Sudanese diaspora has been so relevant
in seeking to support and even center women in development practices (with particular
emphasis on political decision-making), that Erickson and Faria (2011) describe dias-
poric Sudanese women as ‘new and increasingly important citizens and activists in the
post-CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) era’.
An important actor whose activity from abroad has been able to foster female political
empowerment in the origin country is also the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize Leymah Roberta
Gbowee.7 She is a Liberian peace activist responsible for having lead a women’s peace
movement that brought an end to the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003 and contributed
to the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the ﬁrst African female President.
From a broader perspective, aﬃrmative action, as policies that take factors including race,
color, religion, gender, or national origin into consideration in order to beneﬁt an under-
represented group, usually as a means to counter the eﬀects of a history of discrimination,
is a key driver of progress for women. In 2009, the average share of women elected to par-
liament was 13% points higher (27% as opposed to 14%) in countries that applied speciﬁc
measures. Setting a gender quota can be a tangible measure as it happened for Parliament
in Kyrgyzstan. In 2005, there were no women in the Kyrgyz Parliament and only one
woman in a cabinet position. In 2007, following a nationwide discussion facilitated by the
UN Development Programme (UNDP), a 30% gender quota was enshrined in the election
November 2011.
5See http://www.centroromero.org.
6‘Dans son rôle de fédération et de coordination d’un réseau d’associations, la Fédération IFAFE
informe que l’action en 2011 de la Délégation Régionale aux Droits des Femmes et à l’Egalité se structure
autour de 4 axes de la politique des droits des femmes et de l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.
Premierement, l’accès des femmes aux responsabilités dans la vie politique, économique, associative’.
From http://federation-ifafe.com.
7Mrs Leymah Roberta Gbowee spent some time in Virginia where she got a Master Degree in Peace
Building at the Eastern Mennonite University (EMU). At the moment, she resides in Ghana where she
moved before the independence of Liberia.
3code. By 2008, Kyrgyzstan had the highest proportion of women in Parliament (25.6 per
cent) and in Government (21 per cent) in Central Asia. However, the European Women’s
Lobby (EWL), which is the largest umbrella organisation of women’ s associations in the
European Union (EU), stated that parity in democracy implies the equal representation
of women and men in decision-making positions and this goes a step further than quotas
as it is based on the idea that women are not a minority.
Beside this, intangible measures are about to be fostered by International Governmental
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) through advocacy, communications and
capacity building activities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for
example, has supported the participation of women in the political process in Rwanda,
where women now make up 56% of the Parliament, the world’s highest share. Moreover,
the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN
Women) facilitates the participation of NGOs in annual sessions of the Commission on
the Status of Women (CSW) giving voice to their needs.8
Identifying the exact channel through which the transfer of political values through mi-
gration occurs is beyond the scope of this paper so we will restrict our analysis to simply
address whether this mechanism is in place and its causal direction. To this end, we are
using a comprehensive database on female parliamentary representation (Paxton et al.,
2006) and a newly released bilateral migration database (Ozden et al., 2011) from year
1960 to 2000. To describe the propagation of political values, we rely with some insights
on the work by Spilimbergo (2009). We control for endogeneity and reﬂection problem9
thanks to a system GMM estimation. We address selection issues due to female political
eligibility through a two step Heckman estimation strategy in dynamic panel data. After
some due robustness checks and counter factual exercises, we show that total international
migration to countries where the share of female parliamentary seats is higher increased
source country female political voice between 1960 and 2000.
These ﬁndings are of great value for many reasons.
‘Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women’ is one of the Millennium Development
Goals. Women make up more than half of the global population and female electorate yet
continue to be under-represented in all economic and political decision-making bodies at
all levels. According to 2010’ s Interparliamentary Union (IPU) data, the international
average representation of women in parliaments has increased slowly from 11 to 19%
between 1995 and 2010 but this is far short of gender parity. Parliamentary elections in
8See for example the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), Iknowpolitics, Equalitynow, Femnet
and the International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Paciﬁc. The full list is available at
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/.
9See Manski (1993).
42009 contributed to rising gains for women in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and
the Caribbean, where 29% and 25% of the renewed seats went to women, respectively.
But 58 countries still have 10 per cent or fewer female members of parliament. Moreover,
the gap between countries is high with the Swedish Chamber being the most ‘feminized’
with 45% of women in the Parliament, then Netherlands with 40.7% and Belgium 39.3%.
While the lowest shares pertain to the Arab Countries with 11.7%.
It has been put forward how women in politics result in tangible gains for democracy,
including greater responsiveness to citizen needs, increased cooperation across party and
ethnic lines, and more sustainable peace.10 In occasion of the 100th anniversary of Inter-
national Women’s Day (March 8, 2011), whose theme was ‘investing in women and girls’,
also the President Barack Obama praised ‘the extraordinary accomplishments of women
in shaping the country’ s history’.
A large body of the literature has also conﬁrmed the role of women in politics. On the em-
pirical side, Thomas (1991) shows that the states in US with higher female representation
introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children and families
than their male counterparts or than women in states with lower female representation.
Thomas and Welch (1991) ﬁnd that women in state houses in 12 states in the US place
greater priority than men on legislation concerning women, family issues and children.
Case (1998) ﬁnds that the state’s child support enforcement policies strengthen as the
number of female legislators in the state increased. Besley and Case (2000) ﬁnd that
women in the legislature apply pressure to increase family assistance and to strengthen
child support. With Indian data, Clots-Figueras (2011) ﬁnds that female legislators have
a diﬀerential impact on public goods, policy and expenditure decisions compared to the
male counterparts. They invest more than men in schools, female teachers, primary edu-
cation and bed in hospitals and dispensaries. Moreover, female legislators in seats reserved
for lower castes and disadvantaged tribes invest more in health and early education and
favor ‘women friendly’ laws. Along the same lines, Iyer et al. (2011) ﬁnd that an increase
in female representation in local government induces large and signiﬁcant eﬀects on re-
porting of crimes against women in India, thus favoring access to justice for women. On
the theoretical side instead, De la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010) recognize, from a more
general viewpoint, the importance of female empowerment as a multidimensional concept
including economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political em-
powerment, health and survival. They argue that a range of socioeconomic virtues are
widely attached to gender equality, including improved children’s development (through
10Citing Madeleine K. Albright, the United States’ ﬁrst female Secretary of State, in occasion of a
lecture organized in honor of the International Women’s Day by the Informal Group of Women Parlia-
mentarians (WIG) in cooperation with National Democratic Institute (NDI).
5better health and education) and growth.11
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related lit-
erature on ‘transfers of norms’. Section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4
deals with the datasets used to conduct the empirical analysis. Section 5 goes through
the two estimation methods adopted focusing on two issues: the selection problem and
the observed/unobserved heterogeneity. Section 6 provides the empirical results, some
robustness checks and a special subsection in which we perform a counter factual exercise
to assess the importance of the ‘transfer of norms’ eﬀect for each country. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
To investigate the role of diaspora individuals in shaping female political empowerment
we rely on the recent strand of international migration literature on ‘transfers of norms’.
The work on democracy and foreign education by Spilimbergo (2009), and that of fertility
and migration by Fargues (2007) and Beine, Docquier and Schiﬀ (2008) will be our main
references.12 According to them migrants act as preferential channel for fostering changes
in the home country. In particular, Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-educated in-
dividuals promote democracy in their home country, but only if the foreign education is
acquired in democratic countries. Fargues (2007) and Beine et al. (2008) apply the same
mechanism of migration-induced transfers of behavioral norms to fertility. Fargues’ anal-
ysis is based on fertility behavior in three source countries, namely Morocco, Turkey and
Egypt. Discriminating among destinations’ high and low fertility behaviour, he shows that
fertility rates in sending countries are aﬀected by the rates prevailing in their migrants’
host countries, with rates declining in case of migrants sent to low fertility destinations
and increasing in case of migrants sent to high fertility ones. Beine et al. (2008) extend
Fargues’ conclusions using a rigorous econometric model. They provide evidence of a
transfer of fertility norms from migrants to their 208 countries of origin.
11However, diﬀerent forms of women empowerment may lead to more controversial results (see Doepke
and Tertilt, 2011; and Dynan and Rouse, 1997).
12For the sake of information, the mechanism of ‘transfers of norms’ has also been dealt with at micro
level by the recent studies of Omar Mahmoud et al. (2011) where it is shown how Westward migrants
contributed to topple the Communist party in 2009; the one by Kapur (2010) on the eﬀect of international
migration on Indian democracy; Perez- Armendariz and Crow (2010) shows how migration alters the
political participation and behavior of Mexicans living in Mexico; ﬁnally, Batista and Vicente (2011)
ﬁnds that migration to countries with better governance increases demand for political accountability in
Cape Verde. At the macro level, instead, Docquier et al. (2011) study the general eﬀect of migration
toward the major six OECD receiving countries on institutional quality in developing sending countries.
6Linked to the very recent strand of literature of migration induced ‘transfers of norms’ is
also the study by Neumayer and De Soysa (2011) in which an analysis of spatial depen-
dence13 puts forward the role of trade and FDI in fostering the empowerment of women
(Neumayer and De Soysa, 2011).14 The authors test for the propagation of women’s
economic and social rights through trade and FDI. Speciﬁcally, it is suggested that the
incentive to raise women’s rights is stronger where, ﬁrstly, major trading partners and sec-
ondly, the major source countries for FDI themselves provide strong rights. Economic and
social rights are taken from the Cingranelli and Richards’ 2009 Human Rights Database.
Among the economic rights the ‘free choice of profession’ as well as ‘the equality in hir-
ing and promotion practices’ are listed but there is no direct reference to political rights.
Nonetheless, the role of other globalized outcomes such as migration has been not touched.
Our study contributes to the above ﬁndings showing that total international migration to
countries where the share of female parliamentary seats is higher increased source country
female political voice between 1960 and 2000.
3 The Model
To test for the impact of international migration on female parliamentary seats at ori-
gin (seatsF





















iRi;t + i + 't + i;t (1)
where:
 Subscript t refers to the year of interest and goes from 1961 to 2000 (40 years).15
13The phenomenon where policies, standards or similar choices of one unit of analysis depend on the
choices of other units of analysis is commonly known as spatial dependence.
14One of the main messages of the recent World Development Report 2012 puts forward the role of
trade openness as potential instrument for reducing gender disparities. It is stated that ‘In today’s
globalized world, forces such as trade openness and the spread of cheaper information and communica-
tion technologies have the potential to reduce gender disparities by connecting women to markets and
economic opportunities, reshaping attitudes and norms among women and men about gender relations,
and encouraging countries to promote gender equality. But their impact will be muted without eﬀective
domestic public action’.
15t   1 goes from 1960 to 1999.
7Subscript i refers to origin country and subscript j to destination country. 16 The
ﬁnal panel is not balanced.17
 seatsF
i;t represents the female parliamentary share at time t in the country of origin
i.
 seatsF
i;t 1 represents the female parliamentary share at time (t   1) in the country
of origin i.
 migij;t 1 is the bilateral total migration stock from i to j at time (t   1). The
reason why we consider total migration instead of female migration is threefold.
First of all, according to the message given in occasion of the 100th International
Women’s Day by the Director of the Secretariat of the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) Salvano Briceno, ‘Advancing gender perspectives
and women’s rights is not just a job for women, more men must advocate at a
high level for the empowerment of women, and for the incorporation of gender
budgeting into national and local development plans’. Secondly, if we look at the
gender composition of HTAs and OSIMs there is no evidence that eﬀorts to improve
females’conditions are just pursued by female migrants. Recent developments have
shown that policies and work towards gender equality face new challenges related to
men’s role and demands. Reﬂecting on men, masculinities and men’s movements is
therefore of crucial need for women’s organisations.18 Thirdly, according to Doepke
and Tertilt (2009), men care about the other gender in facing a trade-oﬀ between the
rights they want for their own wives (namely none) and the rights of other women
in the economy. Men prefer other men’s wives to have rights because men care
about their own daughters and because an expansion of women’s rights increases
educational investments in children.








is the ‘norm’ at time (t 1) through which for-
eign female parliamentary participation is propagated at origin. Diﬀerently to pre-
vious works, we multiply the migration rate component
migij;t 1
popi;t 1 with the diﬀerence
between the parliamentary share at destination and that in the country of origin.
We expect a positive eﬀect if seatsF
j > seatsF
i . In other terms, the origin country
16In our baseline speciﬁcation, our sample consists in 87 countries. With t equal to 40 and i equal to
87 we can consider our macro panel as a micro one in which N is large and T small. In this case there is
no need to test for unit root (see Ch. 12 in Baltagi (2008)).
17See Appendix A for the countries’ list and Appendix B for the construction of the norm when some
values are missing.
18From the EWL’website http://www.womenlobby.org (Brussels, 7th October 2011).
8takes advantage from the political environment at destination just if the female po-
litical conditions at destination are better than those at origin (we will have instead
a ‘negative transfer of norm’ if seatsF
j < seatsF
i and no transfer if seatsF
j = seatsF
i ).
Moreover, the greater the diﬀerence, the stronger the eﬀect.

Pn
i=1 iRi;t contains other traditional covariates of interest. In the baseline model,
we control for the female skill ratio in country i at time t 1 computed as the ratio
of tertiary educated over illiterate females; the presence of democratic values in the
origin country i at time t; a political variable for the occurrence of legal elections at
time t in country i and the nature of country i’s electoral system at time t. Then
in the extended speciﬁcation, the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women) ratiﬁcation, GDP and trade data, and
female population at time t   1 in country i are accounted for.
 i and 't are country of origin and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
The main references to Eq. (1) are the works by Spilimbergo (2009) and Beine et al.
(2008). To determine the impact of students’ migration on democracy at origin, Spilim-
bergo (2009) regresses the index of democracy19 at time t in country i over the ﬁve years’
lagged value of democracy in country i, the number of students20 abroad as a share of
total population in the sending country, the average level of democracy in the host coun-
tries, and the interaction between the two latter terms. The average level of democracy
in the host countries is constructed as the weighted average of the institution in the host
countries where the weights are given by the share of students from country i to country j
over all students from country i. Beine et al. (2008), also apply the same speciﬁcation in
a cross section setting to assess the impact of migration on source country fertility. The
norm is constructed as the interaction between the (log of) fertility rate21 at destination
with the size of the diaspora.22 With respect to previous studies, our norm diﬀers in
two aspects. First of all, it is able to control for asymmetries between source country
19The author uses three measures of democracy: the Freedom House’s Political Rights Index, which
summarizes a number of dimensions, including the existence of free elections, of competitive parties;
the composite polity II index from the Polity IV dataset, which combines the Polity’s democracy and
autocracy indices; and the dichotomous democracy index proposed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub,
and Limongi (1990) and extended by Boix and Rosato (2001). According to this index a country is not
considered a democracy unless a political party has lost power.
20These data are constructed from the cross country student migration database as reported in the
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. The database covers the time period 1950 to 2003 and refers to students’
migration at the third tier of education (university education and higher).
21Data on fertility rates are taken from the World Development Indicators. The fertility rate is the
average number of children that women have during their lives, from age 15 to age 50.
22Migration data are from the data set developed by Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2007).
9and destination’s female political empowerment and secondly, its weights are given by
emigration rates in order to control for collinearity problems.23
4 Data
4.1 Political Data
Political data come from the database by Paxton, Green and Hughes (2006) titled ‘Women
in Parliament, 1945-2003: Cross-National Dataset’.24 This data collection25 provides
yearly information on women’s inclusion in parliamentary bodies in 204 countries from
1945 to 2003. The dataset allows for extensive, large-scale, cross-national investigation
of the factors that explain women’s attainment of political power over time and pro-
vides comprehensive international and historical information on women in a variety of
political positions. Information is provided on female suﬀrage, the ﬁrst female member
of parliament, yearly percentages of women in parliaments (data refer to the percent of
parliamentary female body in the lower or single house of each country’s national legisla-
ture), when women reached important representational milestones, such as 10 percent, 20
percent, and 30 percent of a legislature, and when women achieved highly-visible political
positions, such as prime minister, president, or head of parliament.
In order to be consistent with migration data, we keep political data from 1960 to 2000.
Then, as far as the ﬁnal country list is concerned, the original sample shrinks to 87 from
204 countries.26
23See Appendix D for a more detailed description of the diﬀerences with previous studies. Appendix C
contains the description of the ‘norm’ as constructed in Spilimbergo (2009) as well as estimation results’
comparison between the norm in Eq.(1) and the Spilimbergo’s one.
24http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
25Data Source: CIA World Factbook, CIA World Factbook Web site., Women in Parliaments 1945-1995,
Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995, Inter-Parliamentary Union Statistical Archive, Inter-Parliamentary
Union Statistical Archive Web site, United States Department of State’s Background Notes, United
States Department of State’s Background Notes Web site, United Nations Statistics Division, United Na-
tions Statistics Division Web site, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database (Cingranelli
and Richards 2004), The New Book of World Rankings, 1984.
26Only 173 countries out of the 204 in the original political data are available in the migration dataset.
The ﬁnal country sample shrinks then to 87 countries in accordance with the geographical sample of the
other data described in subsection 3.3. See Appendix A.
104.2 Migration Data
Migration information rely on a new released bilateral database described in Ozden et
al. (2011). They provide decennal global matrices of bilateral migrant stocks spanning
the period 1960-2000, disaggregated by gender and based primarily on the foreign-born
concept. Over one thousand separate census and population register records are combined
to construct decennal matrices corresponding to census rounds for the entire period. In
doing so, the authors provide for the ﬁrst time, a complete picture of bilateral global
migration over the second half of the twentieth century.27
Since migration data are available by decade for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000,
while political data contains yearly observations, in order to get annual migration data,
we extended the original migration decennal matrix by interpolation. We computed the
missing migration yearly data applying a constant annual rate of growth within each
decade (according to persistence in migration stocks).
4.3 Other Data
Additional explanatories have been collected using the following databases.
Data on total and female population, GDP per capita are from the World Bank Develop-
ment Indicators 2008. Female human capital indicators used to construct the female skill
ratio are from the new released version of Barro and Lee (2010). Barro and Lee’ s data
are available every ﬁve years. We made them compatible with the political one (that are
yearly data) thanks to the same interpolation technique we dealt with migration missing
data.28 The indicator for democracy is from the POLITY IV data set while data on le-
gal elections and electoral systems (proportional, majoritarian, mixed and multi-tier) are
from Golder (2005). Data on CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women) ratiﬁcation have been collected by ourselves. We construct a
dummy variable that changes from 0 to 1 from the year in which the convention has been
ratiﬁed by the country.29 Religion data to identify countries with more than 80 percent of
Muslin population are taken from LaPorta et al. (1999). For the exogenous instruments,
data on natural disasters come from the International Disaster Database by the Centre on
the Epidemiology of Disasters. EM-DAT contains essential core data on the occurrence
and eﬀects of over 18,000 mass disasters in the World from 1900 to present. The database
27See Appendix B for the construction of missing migration data.
28We basically computed a ﬁve-yearly growth rate and apply it as constant to each missing human
capital yearly observation.
29The Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations Headquarters on 1 March 1980.
Although the United States never ratiﬁed the convention, CEDAW has become the main international
legal document on women’s rights.
11is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organisations,
insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies.30 Data on trade are taken
from Feenstra et al. (2004) who provide yearly World trade ﬂows from 1962-2000.
5 Empirical Methodology
We estimate Eq.(1) adopting two methods. We start using the Blundell and Bond system
GMM estimator and we then account for selection using an Heckman strategy applied to
dynamic panel data (Jimenez-Martin, 2006 and Jimenez-Martin, Labeaga and Rochina-
Barrachina, 2009, and Wooldridge, 2002). We are so able to account for selection issues,
observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
5.1 Sample selection issue
The sample selection issue is linked to the nature of political data. In the original Paxton
et al. (2006) political database, there are indeed three types of missing values. There are
the so called ‘true missing’ (173 observations) due to the fact that the authors could not
ﬁnd positive data, a second type of missing (83 observations) due to coup d’etat, and a
third type of missing due to the absence of the Parliament (4781 values). The absence of
the Parliament can be due in her turn to several factors: the presence of a dictatorship,
‘false elections’ or the absence of sovranity, i.e. colonial reasons.
In the original political database the number of zeroes is 1100. The authors do not
discriminate between what we name as ‘true zeroes’ (due to the fact that females are
eligible but they are not elected) and ‘false’ zeroes (due to the fact that females are not
eligible yet, i.e. they cannot stand for election even if there is a Parliament).
Keeping the political data as they are and estimating directly Eq.(1) with GMM would
provide biased estimates because of three reasons. First, the proportion of true missing
values, secondly the presence of ‘false’ zeroes and thirdly a possible triple sample selection
issue31 linked to those missing values due to the lack of Parliament. Concerning ‘true
30EM-DAT deﬁnes a disaster as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, neces-
sitating a request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database at
least one of the following criteria must be fulﬁlled: (1) 10 or more people reported killed; (2) 100 people
reported aﬀected; (3) declaration of a state of emergency; or (4) call for international assistance.
31Following Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman (2009, 2010) a triple selection issue can arise if we kept
the political dataset as it is. The ﬁrst selection would be linked to the probability for a country of
having a Parliament, the second one to the probability that a woman can be elected given the presence
of a Parliament. Third, there is the endogenous probability that the share of women elected in the
12missing’ values, we have transformed them in a historical/political compatible way into
either missing values, zeroes or positive observed values using an additional political
dataset (Armingeon and Careja, 2008).32 Secondly, as far as the zeroes are concerned, we
transformed ‘false’ zeroes into missing and kept the ‘true’ ones as they are. Finally, for
the selection issue, we set an initial probability in such a way that a well identiﬁed initial
population of interest can be speciﬁed.33 This makes the triple selection issue boiling
down into a common sample selection one.
We set the initial probability as the probability for a woman to ‘be eligible’. In other
terms, we construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if women are eligible and zero otherwise.
According to the political data at our disposal, women are eligible in two cases. When
the female parliamentary share is positive or when it is equal to a ‘true’ zero (i.e. women
can be elected but they are not34). Women are instead not eligible in two cases: ﬁrst, in
case of missing values due to the absence of the Parliament (i.e. coup d’état, dictatorship
war, ‘false elections’, no sovranity or colonialism) and secondly in case or ‘false’ zeroes
(i.e. women cannot be elected because they haven’t got the right to be voted yet). In
other terms, we reasonably assume that the absence of female suﬀrage (probability for a
woman to ‘be not eligible’) is as if the Parliament were not there. Table 1 describes the
composition of the political database before and after the changes we have just mentioned
in order to control for selection. The ﬁrst column refers to the original database which
goes from 1945 to 2003, while the second column (which refers to the period 1960-2000)
takes into account the changes made by ourselves in order to control for selection.
Table 1: Composition of the political data
(1945-2003) (1960-2000)
Total observations 12036 7093
Positive observed values 5801 4274
True missing values 173 27
Missing Values (due to coup d’état) 83 -
Missing Values (due to absence of Parliament) 4781 -




33See Ch. 17 in Wooldridge (2002): ‘There is an important general point to remember: sample selection
can only be an issue once the population of interest has been carefully speciﬁed’.
34Assuming that there are some women who run for the position when the female parliamentary share
is equal to zero. Unfortunately we do not have data on political entry.
135.2 System GMM without accounting for selection
To estimate Eq.(1), we ﬁrst use the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998)
without accounting for selection. This means that the estimation sample is restricted to
cases in which the probability for a woman to ‘be eligible’ is equal to 1. This probability
is 1 in two cases: if the female parliamentary share is higher than 0 or if it is equal to zero
(i.e. women have the right to be elected but nobody vote for them). As Table 2 shows,
there are 4766 cases in which women are eligible and 2327 cases in which they are not.
Then concerning the former case, there are 470 cases in which women had the total or
partial right to be voted but the parliamentary share is 0 and 4296 cases in which women
had the total or partial right to be voted and the parliamentary share is higher than 0. 35
Table 2: Female political eligibility
Fem. parl. share>=0 Fem. parl. share=0 Fem. parl. share>0
Women are eligible 4766 470 4296
Women are not eligible 2327 - -
The system GMM estimator combines the regression in diﬀerences with the regression
in levels in a single system. It allows us to overcome endogeneity issues due to the
lagged dependent and other lagged explanatory variables as well as possible reﬂection
problems (Manski, 1993), instrumenting endogenous variables with internal instruments.
This estimator includes country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and it is preferable to a standard
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator since the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in a ﬁxed
eﬀects model would lead to so-called Nickell (1981) bias because the lagged dependent
variable is correlated with the error term. In addition, the system GMM is the most
appropriate estimator when time series are very persistent as in our case (see Bond et
al., 2001). Using too many instruments can bias the GMM estimation results (Roodman,
2009). We have, therefore, restricted the maximum lag of instruments and collapsed the
instrument sets in order to keep the number of instruments lower than the number of
groups. 36
As far as reﬂection issues are concerned, the ‘norm’ can be endogenous because if equations
for each country i were written in a system, the female parliamentary share would appear
35After having merged the political data with the other data, the cases in which ‘women are eligible’
shrink to 1774 (1732 if we account for selection) while those for which ‘women are not eligible’ become 978
(677 accounting fro selection). Under the ﬁrst condition, there ar 59 cases in which female parliamentary
share is equal to 0 (55 if selection is accounted for.)
36Usually, the system GMM estimator includes separate instruments for each time period. In our case,
given the number of time periods we have, we would end up with too many instruments. This is why we
collapsed the matrix of instruments.
14either as regressand for country i and as regressor within the norm for country (i + 1),
(i + 2), etc. In addition to that it can be argued that the relationship between female
political empowerment and international migration goes in the other way round through
female migration. In other words, international female migration can be seen as a way
out of political discrimination. However, even if a signiﬁcant non-economic literature
has examined the relationship between international migration and the empowerment of
women, the direction of the causality is still an open issue (Hugo, 2000). It can indeed
hinge on many factors, such as the context in which the migration occurs, the type
of movement, the characteristics of the female migrants, and last but not least on the
deﬁnition of empowerment used. In our regressions, the ‘norm’ variable is considered as
endogenous and instrumented using from its own second lag onward.
5.3 GMM plus Heckman
The second method to estimate Eq.(1) consists in applying an Heckman strategy to a dy-
namic panel setting as in Jimenez-Martin (2006), and Jimenez-Martin and Garcia (2010).
The ﬁrst step consists in estimating a selection equation with a year-by-year Probit model
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if women are eligible and 0 other-
wise. Then, we compute the inverse Mills ratio for each observation in each time period.
In the second stage, we estimate with system GMM the initial model (where the female
parliamentary share is on the left hand side) on the selected sample, including also the
inverse Mills ratio, which controls for the selection bias.
To estimate the selection equation, we need at least one additional exogenous instrument.
We have chosen data on natural disasters. The reason is straightforward. The eﬀect of
natural disasters can be as strong as those of wars in terms of poverty, dissatisfaction, lack
of political stability, but contrary to them, they are heaven sent.37 Moreover, Wooldridge
(2002, Ch. 17, p. 585-587) suggests we can also plug superior lags of initial covariates.38
37The rationale of the exogenous instrument is to bring the following additional information: what
would have been the female parliamentary share in a country where females had have been eligible?
38Under the assumption that the error term in Eq.(1) is not serially correlated, lags of variables are,
in principle, valid internal instruments. They can therefore be included as explanatory variables in the
selection Probit equation. However, the validity of superior lags as instruments can be indeed due to the
non linear nature of the Probit model once it is plugged into a linear one instead of being due to the real
exogeneity of the instruments. That’s why an exogenous instrument is strongly recommended.
156 Estimation Results
6.1 General Results
Table 3 reports estimation results using OLS and system GMM (the most appropriate
estimator in this context). Our dependent variable is the share of seats held by women
in the lower or single house in national parliament. Column (1) and column (3) report
respectively OLS and SYS-GMM estimates from our baseline speciﬁcation which contains
the lagged female parliamentary share, the lagged index of female parliamentary share
(henceforth the ‘norm’) and other control variables. In particular, we consider a measure
of female human capital, a measure of democracy, a variable called legal election which
indicates the number of elections to national lower chamber occurred in the year of the
same legislature39 and a dummy equal to 1 if the electoral system is proportional.
All the variables in the baseline speciﬁcation have the expected sign, considering both the
estimation methods, and they are stable when adding additional covariates (from column
4 onward). The lagged value of female parliamentary share is positive and signiﬁcant.
The norm is positive and signiﬁcant, too, implying that total migration is a positive and
important channel through which female parliamentary share in the origin country raises.
Female human capital is then positive and statistically signiﬁcant, meaning that women’s
empowerment is dependent on decreasing levels of female illiteracy and increasing fe-
male education.40 This is a crucial covariate in explaining female political empowerment:
women need human and ﬁnancial capital (gained through education and work experience)
to stand for oﬃce (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). As a proxy for female human capital,
we generate the ratio between the number of females aged more than 25 years old with
tertiary completed education and females with no schooling.
An indicator of democracy is also considered and estimates are in line with the literature.
Indicators of democracy measure the general openness of political institutions and com-
bine several aspects such as: the presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express eﬀective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the exis-
tence of institutionalized constraints to the exercise of power by the executive power; and
the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political
participation. In our case, we consider a composite index called Polity2 that ranges from
39It takes value equal to 1 if one legal election occurs and 0 otherwise. For 8 countries it takes value
equal to 2, as two elections were held in the same year.
40Women’s workforce participation may also favor women’s political participation. We indirectly con-
trol for workforce participation through human capital (of course, the two variables are highly correlated).
We cannot introduce female labor force participation rate as a control variable, as data are available only
from the 80’s.
16-10 to + 10, with 10 corresponding to the most democratic set of institutions. The eﬀect
of democracy on women’s political representation, may be ambiguous. On the one hand,
it may be easy for women to be elected to a powerless parliament or under an authoritar-
ian system, built on egalitarian ideologies like the ex-communist countries where female
parliamentary participation was high. On the other hand, more democratic countries may
favor women’s political participation. Polity II is positive and in general slightly signiﬁ-
cant, indicating that the average level of democracy enhances female political conditions.
Finally, the election variable is positive and signiﬁcant as well as the proportional nature of
the electoral system. It is recognized in the political science literature that proportional
systems, rather than majority ones, help women to access the political system (e.g.,
Paxton et al., 2010, Jalalzai and Krook, 2010, McAllister and Studlar, 2002). Proportional
systems make use of multi-member districts, which implies that more than one candidate
can be elected from a particular district, and often have closed party lists, which means
that citizens vote for the party lists of candidates rather than individual candidates. Under
a list system, parties may feel compelled to nominate women in order to balance the list.
Moreover, the higher the district magnitude the greater the probability for a woman to
be nominated, if the political party is expecting to win several seats in the district.41
As the measure of female parliamentary share is highly persistent (new elections occur
on average every ﬁve years, therefore it may happen that some values of parliamentary
participation do not change year-by-year) we also control for its second lag either in the
OLS and in the SYS-GMM speciﬁcation (column (2) and (4) respectively). The second
lag is not statistically signiﬁcant but what matters is that the sign and the signiﬁcance of
the other covariates do not change.
From columns (5)-(8), other potential traditional explanatory variables are added to the
baseline speciﬁcation. In particular, we consider the CEDAW (Convention on the Elim-
ination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women) ratiﬁcation, GDP per capita (in
log), female population (in log) and a trade variable. The CEDAW ratiﬁcation implies
that countries, which ratiﬁed the convention, should meet the minimum standards to
reach equal women rights. Moreover, the countries involved should regularly provide the
41Of course, concerning electoral system’s characteristics, the introduction of an electoral gender quota
may encourage greater representation of women. Unfortunately, we cannot directly control for quotas,
as data are available only for the most recent election years (see the Global Database of Quotas for
Women at http://www.quotaproject.org/ by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance-IDEA). The rapid diﬀusion of gender quota across countries has indeed occurred within the
last 15 years. The inclusion of time dummies in our speciﬁcation should capture the general increase
in female representation due to the contemporaneous introduction of gender quotas in political systems.
In addition, as many studies ﬁnd that the greatest impact of quotas occur under electoral systems with
closed list and higher district magnitude (see Jalalzai and Krook, 2008), controlling for the proportional
nature of electoral system means also indirectly controlling for the implementation of gender quotas.
17measures they have taken to reach this goal. As in True and Mintrom (2001), CEDAW
is not signiﬁcant (column 5) and this can be due to two reasons. First, some countries
decide to ratify just because of international visibility with little intention to change gen-
der relation, secondly some countries ratify later as a consequence of lack of burocratic
conditions. In column 6, we control for (the logarithm of) GDP per capita because de-
velopment itself matters for women (Burn, 2005).42 GDP per capita is not statistically
signiﬁcant and this can be due to high correlation with the level of human capital. The
same holds for female population, presumably highly correlated with total population in
the migration rate. In column 7, we ﬁnally control for a trade index, because economic
integration may also convey cultural norms supporting women’s political participation.
The trade norm is built in a symmetric way as ours, constructing a weighted average of
the diﬀerence in female parliamentary share with trading partners where the weights are










). Our estimated coeﬃcient is
negative, meaning that trade is a measure of openness that goes in opposite direction
with respect to migration.43
In the last column, we include all the explanatory variables (except for the second lagged
value of female parliamentary share). Our main results do not change.
In all the empirical speciﬁcations just mentioned, we also include country and time ﬁxed
eﬀects, therefore the results are robust to all country-speciﬁc time-invariant characteristics
which may inﬂuence female political representation. They encounter religion44, colonial
history45 and many other unobservable characteristics.
In the SYS-GMM estimations, the instruments used in the ﬁrst diﬀerentiated equation
are the same as in Arellano-Bond (1991), but the instruments for the equation in level are
42As explained in Bertocchi (2011), the logarithm of GDP per capita can be also considered as a proxy
for the gender wage gap, given the strong negative correlation between the two measures.
43This result has to be taken with caution. We have indeed to notice that the trade dataset has much
more missing values than the migration one. It could be also the case that when considering trade, the
‘negative’ transfer is prevailing. In unreported robustness checks, we ﬁrst control for the general openness
of the country, using trade/gdp (lagged) as control variable and then for the updated version of Sachs
and Warner’s trade policy openness indicator of Wacziarg and Welch(2008). In both cases, the openness
indicator is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, plugging all the trade controls together, we
do not ﬁnd any diﬀerent results.
44Conservative religious ideologies usually prevent women from public activities. The Islamic law, for
example, is typically acknowledged for its limited women’s role in public; or catholicism which has been
historically in opposition to women’s enfranchisement, a ﬁrst step in the achievement of equal political
rights (Bertocchi, 2011).
45Since a country with a history of colonialism may exhibit slower incorporation of women into the
political realm than countries never colonized (Paxton et al., 2006).
18the lagged diﬀerences of the corresponding variables.46 In our speciﬁcations, the lagged
dependent variable is instrumented using from its own ﬁfth to sixth lag. The reason is
straightforward. As on average new elections occur every ﬁve years, the ﬁfth and the sixth
lags allow us to consider as instruments the parliamentary shares of previous elections (in
other terms, this allows us to take into account the political change of each legislature).
Our variable of interest, i.e. the lagged index of female parliamentary share, and the lagged
index in trading partners are treated as endogenous and instrumented using from their
own second to sixth lags. The legal election variable, the proportional system dummy and
the CEDAW variable are considered as exogenous. All the other explanatory variables
are considered as pre-determined and instrumented using from their own ﬁrst to sixth
lags. All the instruments are collapsed, in order to avoid instrument proliferation due to
the large number of time periods.47
We test the validity of moments conditions by using the test of overidentifying restrictions
proposed by Sargan and Hansen and by testing the null hypothesis that the error term is
not second order serially correlated. Furthermore, we test the validity of the additional
moment conditions associated with the level equation using the Hansen diﬀerence test for
all GMM instruments. The tests conﬁrm the validity of our instruments.48
6.2 Results accounting for selection
Table 4 reports estimation results after having controlled for selection. Columns (1) and
(2) report estimates from a standard two-step Heckman selection model (in which the
inverse Mills ratio is derived from a probit estimation in the full sample, and is then
added into the model estimated by OLS in the selected sample) applied to our baseline
speciﬁcation (both with and without the second lag of female parliamentary share). Then,
in columns (3) and (4), the same speciﬁcation is estimated applying the Heckman selection
strategy to a SYS-GMM as described in sub-section 5.3.
In the probit model, we consider as regressors the index for democracy (lagged once), the
46In order to use these additional instruments, a moment condition for the level equation, which implies
that ﬁrst diﬀerences of pre-determined explanatory variables are orthogonal to the country ﬁxed eﬀects,
must be satisﬁed.
47It has to be noticed that results are robust to diﬀerent instrument sets regarding the length of lags
used.
48A particular concern related to this method is the risk of instrument proliferation. Indeed, if on the
one hand the use of the entire set of instruments in a GMM context gives signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains, on
the other hand, a large collection of instruments could overﬁt endogenous variables as well as weaken
the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. The instrument proliferation problem is particularly
important in small samples, but unfortunately there is no formal test to detect it, even if a possible rule




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20skill ratio for females (lagged twice) and the number of natural disasters which occur in
the country.49 The ﬁrst two regressors are internal instruments50 used in the SYS-GMM
estimation, not correlated with the female parliamentary share, but presumably correlated
with the probability for a woman to be eligible and/or to have parliamentary session in
the country. The number of natural disasters is used as external instrument. While we do
not see any direct correlation with female parliamentary share, natural disasters are likely
to aﬀect the probability for a women to be eligible or, in a broader sense, the probability
to have parliamentary session in the country. Natural disasters could indeed aﬀect the
likelihood of radical political revolutions.51 They could increase the risk of violent civil
conﬂict (Nel and Righarts, 2008), and foster political changes and/or democratization
(see Axelrad, 2011). As countries with poor and less democratic institutions usually suﬀer
more from natural disasters, being less able to manage the situation (Kahn, 2005), natural
events can be crucial in showing the weakness of bad governments and be therefore a key
factor for catalyzing political change in an authoritarian regime (Axelrad, 2011). Indeed,
when natural events lead to transitory negative income shocks, they cause autocratic
regimes make democratic concessions in order to avoid costly repression (Bruckner and
Ciccone, 2011).52 In our probit regressions, the frequency of natural disasters statistically
increases the probability for a women to be eligible and/or to have a parliament in the
country.
After having estimated the Probit model, the inverse Mills ratios have been added into
the baseline model as additional regressors. They are negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in all the estimated speciﬁcations.53
After having controlled for sample selection, we still ﬁnd that total migration is a positive
and signiﬁcant channel through which female parliamentary share in the country of origin
raises. The additional explanatory variables still have the expected sign. The proxy for
female human capital variable is positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. The election variable is
positive and signiﬁcant as well as the proportional nature of the electoral system. Only
the indicator of democracy now turns out to be negative, and not statistically signiﬁcant
49We consider the logarithm of the number of natural disaster plus 1, in order not to loose observations
for which natural disasters are zeros.
50See Wooldridge (2002).
51It has been argued, for instance, that the 1972’s earthquake which devastated Managua in Nicaragua
played a role in the fall of Somoza dictatorship; or that the 1978’s earthquake in Iran caused the revolution
that occurred just after (see Cavallo et al., 2010).
52Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) consider data on rainfall shocks in Sub-Sahara African countries to
empirically test the eﬀect of transitory economic shocks on democratic transition.
53In Table 4 only the pooled probit is reported. In SYS-GMM estimations, the inverse Mills ratios
are obtained from a year-by-year model of the probability for a women to be eligible. Year-by-year
estimations are not reported, but available upon request.
21in the GMM estimations. The AR(2) test, the Hansen test and the diﬀerence Hansen test
conﬁrm the validity of the instruments used in the SYS-GMM regressions.
6.3 Robustness tests
6.3.1 Heterogeneity in Sample
In order to test out the robustness of our empirical results, we estimate our baseline spec-
iﬁcation (under selection and with and without the second lag of female parliamentary
share) in selected subsamples. First of all, we exclude socialist countries (i.e. countries
which belonged to the Iron Curtain) to be sure that their presence does not boost es-
timation results. In the former Communist Bloc, indeed, the proportion of women in
parliaments was very high, given the fact that these authoritarian systems were built on
egalitarian ideologies. After the fall of Communism, as parliaments in post-communist
countries gained real power, the percentage of female seats sharply fell. Table 5 shows
that our main results are preserved when excluding socialist countries. Another concern
refers to the presence of Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Looking at the Global Gender
Gap Index 2010 (Hausmann et al., 2010), which considers how equitably the available in-
come, resources and opportunities are distributed between women and men, Sub-Saharan
African countries have the lowest value after Mena countries. Since we do not have Mena
countries in our initial sample, we exclude Sub-Saharan African countries. Our results are
preserved. The last concern is whether Muslim countries, where women are sometimes
prevented from public activities, may aﬀect our results. Countries with more than 80 per-
cent of Muslim population are excluded from our sample.54 Again, there is no evidence
that heterogeneity plays any role in explaining our results.
6.3.2 5-year data
In Table (6) we test for the robustness of our results, considering a 5-year panel data set
instead of yearly data. The reason is threefold. The persistence in the political data is
reduced, as the values considered better proxy the elections in the previous legislature.
Secondly, ﬁve year data allow us to deal with less persistent human capital and migration
data. Thirdly, a longer period for the occurrence of a ‘transfer of norm’ mechanism is taken
into account. However, there is a drawback in this procedure which consists in loosing
some information regarding the annual political evolution in each country. Column (1) and
column (2) show respectively OLS and SYS-GMM results from our baseline speciﬁcation
54We exclude from the sample: Bangladesh, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Turkey.
22without accounting for selection. In SYS-GMM estimation the lagged dependent, human
capital and democracy are instrumented with their own ﬁrst to second lags, while for
the norm variable its own second lag is used. All the other variables are considered as
exogenous.55 In column (3), (4), (5) we account for selection using respectively the Heckit
and SYS-GMM estimations.56 Across diﬀerent estimation methods, we show how our
main results are preserved.
6.4 Counterfactual analysis
From previous analysis the impact of migration in transferring political norms appears to
be statistically relevant. In order to further investigate and assess the importance of this
eﬀect at country-speciﬁc level, we simulate the counterfactual female parliamentary share
obtained in two extreme cases. We consider ﬁrst a simulated scenario in which migration
is set equal to 0 (i.e. no transfers of norms occur). Secondly, we consider another scenario
where we assume that all migrants are sent to the destination country with the highest
female parlamentary share in our sample (Sweden). The latter case allows us to assess
the possible maximum eﬀect of the norm in trasferring political values.
To set up the two environments , we start from our empirical model (1), and we consider
the estimated coeﬃcients in the baseline regression when we account for selection in SYS-
GMM regressions. In particular, we focus on the short run coeﬃcients obtained in the
estimations with yearly data.
As we outlined in subsection 6.3.2, both 1-year and 5 years panel data regressions are
imperfect. When using 5-year data, persistency is reduced, a longer period for the oc-
currence of a ‘transfer of norm’ mechanism is considered, and the political data better
proxy legislatures. However, a 5-year panel data set does not take into account important
information regarding the political evolution in each country. For example, many coun-
tries, and above all developing countries, are characterized by political instability which
may translate in more than one election within ﬁve years. At the same time, when taking
5-year data, we are likely to miss important information concerning the occurrence of
coup d’etat, false election, and all the other cases proxied through the missing values we
generated if parliamentary sessions are not observed. Yearly data, instead, allows us to
consider the livelong political evolution of each country, and that’s the reason why we pre-
fer estimations using yearly data than 5-year data. However, since both the estimations
(with yearly and ﬁve year data) have some shortcomings in their dynamics, we prefer to
focus our counterfactual analysis on short-run coeﬃcients instead of long-run predictions.
55Here, the matrix of instruments is not collapsed, as in the standard SYS-GMM estimator.
56For robustness in column (5) the matrix of instruments is collapsed.
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where ^ indexseatsF
i;t 1 = 0. Taking the diﬀerence between (1) and (2) gives us the change
in the female parliamentary seats:
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For simplicity, we consider data for the year 2000 and  = 2:204 and we construct the
counterfactual values for female parliamentary seats ( ^ seatsF
i;t) in each country in the case
of no migration (i.e. no transfers of norms). The dashed line in ﬁgure 6.4 shows the coun-
terfactual value for female parliamentary seats in the case of no migration. As we can
see from the graph, for some countries the counterfactual value for female parliamentary
participation in 2000 is lower than the observed value in the same year of interest. This
is especially true for countries with lower female political empowerment, in particular
developing countries, for which migration is shown to be particularly relevant in improv-
ing women conditions. For other countries with a high share of females in parliament,
like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, instead, the counterfactual value is higher than
the observed one, meaning that migration may decrease in some cases female political
empowerment.57
57To give some numerical examples, the countries that ‘loose’ the most without migration are Cyprus,
Albania, Armenia, where no transfers of norm/migration will cause female parliamentary seats to go from
24In a second and symmetric counterfactual experiment, we compute the maximum eﬀect
the transfer of norm mechanism could have. We assume that all migrants are sent to the
country with the most feminized parliament (i.e. all migrants are sent to Sweden which
has 42.7 percent of female parliamentary seats in 2000). As the dotted line in Figure 6.4
shows, all the countries have a higher share of female parliamentary seats, with an average
increase of 4.35 percentage points.58
a positive value to 0 (we set it to 0, as for the simulations it became negative). For Turkey, instead,
female parliamentary seats would decrease from 4.2 to 1.84 (i.e. a decrease of more than 50 percent). For
countries like Namibia or Central African Republic, there are almost no changes (female parliamentary
share would change respectively respectively from 25 to 24.988, and from 7.3 to 7.297). On the other
hand, the countries which would gain more from a ‘no transfer of norm’ environment, are Sweden, with
an increase in female parliamentary seats from 42.7 to 44.23; the Netherlands from 36 to 37.67; but also
New Zealand (from 29.2 to 31.45) and Guyana (from 18.5 to 21.51).
58The maximum eﬀect would occur for Guyana with an increase of 27.91 percentage points (from 18.5











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Figure 1: Predicting the female parliamentary shares using two counterfactuals
7 Conclusion
Women make up more than half of the population in the World. Female electorate have
globally grown up in the last two decades but yet continue to be under-represented in
political decision-making bodies at all levels. The very recent World Development Report
2012 states that gender equality matters for development enhancing productivity, creating
a better environment for the next generation and making institutions more representative.
In addition to that, there is evidence (Clots-Figueras, 2011; Thomas, 1991) that women
in politics improve development outcomes for women themselves, children and families.
The World Bank (2011) wonders whether ‘globalization can help’ in fostering gender
equality. In this paper we have partly answered to this providing some evidence on
29how a globalized outcome such as international migration has contributed to the increase
of female parliamentary participation from 1960 to 2000. In other terms, international
migrants have acted as ‘informational’ channels able to transfer foreign values, create
favorable opportunities, reshape attitudes and create new norms about women in the
origin country.
Following the brand new strand of literature on ‘transfers of norms’ (Spilimbergo, 2009;
Beine et al., 2008 and Fargues, 2007), we have applied the same mechanism to female
political participation. To this end, we estimated a dynamic model in which female ac-
cess to Parliament depends on traditional covariates plus international migration. The
empirics contains three important insights. First of all, the norm (through which foreign
female parliamentary participation is propagated at origin) has been constructed in such
a way that the origin country takes advantage from the political environment at destina-
tion just if the female political conditions at destination are better than those at origin.
Secondly, in order to control for selection due to women’s political eligibility, we have
estimated our model using an Heckman selection strategy applied to dynamic panel data
(Jimenez-Martin, 2006 and Jimenez-Martin, Labeaga and Rochina-Barrachina, 2009, and
Wooldridge, 2002). Thirdly, in the ﬁrst step of the Heckman procedure, an external in-
strument has been used exploiting the emerging works on natural disasters and political
outcomes (Brückner and Ciccone, 2011).
Results, which are robust to diﬀerent time and geopolitical speciﬁcations, show that female
political emancipation can be accounted as another migration non economic externality,
suggesting that the launch of domestic public actions can be also supported by the role
of active national people from abroad.
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369 Appendix A: Countries’list
We work with 87 countries: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Re-
public of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia.
3710 Appendix B: Construction of the norms
In order to construct the ‘norms’ in Equation 1, the ﬁnal matrix should be perfectly bal-
anced. By ﬁnal matrix we mean the matrix comprising: migration data (from Ozden et
al., 2011), political data (from Paxton et al., 2006), total population (from World Devel-
opment Indicators 2008).
For migration data, data for Czechoslovakia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and USSR were not available. We reconstructed missing observations aggregating mi-
gration data for the countries belonging to them before the political scission. So for
Czechoslovakia before year 1993 (replaced by missing values then), we aggregated data
from Czech Republic and Slovakia. For the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before
year 1992 (replaced by missing values then), we aggregated data from Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. For USSR before year 1991 (replaced by missing values then), we aggregated
data from Ukraine, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Tajikistan, Republic of Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Arme-
nia, Latvia and Estonia. For the 19% of the sample cells (except for missing observations
due to the splits we discussed before) which are missing, since the couples concerned do
not belong to the main migration routes, we have set these values to 0. For political data,
we explained in Appendix A how we dealt with ‘true missing values’, while for the other
missing cells (about 31% of the sample) due to political instability, coup d’etat, dictator-
ship war, presence of ‘false elections’, lack of sovranity due to colonialism, we have set
them to 0 because of lack of Parliament. For total population (3% of the sample) miss-
ing values have been replaced using UN data. Missing population data are for: Nauru,
Afghanistan 1990-2000, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Comoros,Dominica, Iraq 2000,
Kiribati, Kuwait 1992-1994, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Palau, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, San Marino, Seychelles, Tuvalu. We dropped those countries for which all the
time span from 1960 to 2000 was missing. We replaced missing total population cells for
the other countries with data from United Nations Population Division. UN Population
Data are available every ﬁve years. We assumed a constant rate of growth within the ﬁve
years.
Once we have dealt with missing values in each dataset to make each of them balanced, we
have merged the three of them to get the ﬁnal one. Then the norms have been constructed.
3811 Appendix C: Diﬀerence with previous studies
The main reference to our empirical speciﬁcation is the work by Spilimbergo (2009).
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i;t 1). Just considering the level of female parliamentary share
at destination, would have prevent from taking into account political asymmetries
between origin and destination countries. With this speciﬁcation, indeed, the ‘trans-
fer of norm’ is always positive if seatsF
i;t 1 is greater than 0, apart from the level
of female parliamentary share at origin. In considering the diﬀerence between fe-
male parliamentary shares between destination and origin countries, instead, we
assume that there is a ‘positive transfer’ only when migrants are in countries where
female political conditions are better, and that the transfer is higher, the greater
the political diﬀerence between the two countries.
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where the weights are given by emigration shares. In Eq.(1), instead, the weights are just



















Obviously, due to the diﬀerent nature of Spilimbergo’s norm, Eq.(5) also contains the to-
tal migration rate calculated as the ratio between total aggregate migration from country
i over total population in country i and the interaction term between the total migration
rate and the average index of female political participation at destination.
Table 7 compares estimation results from estimating Eq.(1) and Eq.(5) with System GMM
(with and without selection). The ﬁrst two columns refer to Eq.(1) (as in column (2) of
Table 3 and column (4) in Table 4) while the third and the fourth ones refer to Eq.(5).
As far as estimation results from Eq.(5) are concerned, the lagged index of female par-
liamentary share  a la Spilimbergo aﬀects the female parliamentary participation at time
t but the interaction with migration rate is not signiﬁcant as in Beine et al. (2008) and
sometimes in Spilimbergo (2009). The lack of signiﬁcance can be due to collinearity since
migration rate appears three times as regressor: alone, then it is used as weight in the
norm, and as multiplicative term (as migration share) in the interaction term. Indeed,
the collinearity between the interaction term and the migration rate is more than 90%.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4112 Appendix D: Addressing the ‘true missing’ values
in Paxton et al. (2006)
Here is the list of countries which contains true missing values:
 Belarus : data from 1995-1999 are true missing. The missing cells have been com-
plemented by the CPDS II (Armingeon and Careja 2008), which covers 28 post-
communist countries for the 1989-2008 period.
 Benin: years 1960, 1961, 1962,1964 are true missing. Following Benin political and
historical information, we transformed true missing values into missing.
 Bhutan: year 1996 is a true missing. It has been replaced with an observed data
from IPU (01/1996 elections).
 Bosnia Herzegovina: true missing for 1996-1999. We replaced years 1996-1997
with missing data in accordance with the female parliamentary share in contigu-
ous countries, e.g. Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. While years 1998-1999 have
been complemented by the CPDS II (Armingeon and Careja, 2008), which covers
28 post-communist countries for the 1989-2008 period.
 Cambodia: year 2003 is a true missing. It has been replaced by the observed positive
value from IPU, election 07-2003.
 Democratic Republic of the Congo: true missing data for 1992-1993, 2000-2002 and
2003. The average female parliamentary share between years 1991-1994 replace the
ﬁrst missing biennium since data are quite stable. True missing data from 2000-
2002 have been transformed into missing because of political instability and civil
war. True missing for 2003 has been replaced by data from IPU election 08/2003.
 Democratic Yemen: the country has been dropped because true missing cells exceed
the 50%.
 Gambia: data from 1977 to 1981 are true missing. They have been replaced by 0
as women started to stand for election from 1982.
 Guinea: true missing data from 1981-1984 have been transformed into missing for
political instability.
 Guyana: true missing from 1964-1967 have been changed into missing because the
ﬁrst parliamentary election occurs in 1968 (from Golder, 2005).
42 Kiribati: true missing for year 2003 has been substituted with the observed positive
value from IPU , election 05/2003.
 Latvia: true missing values from 1990 to 1992 have been replaced by missing. Latvia
starts its sovranity in 1991. According to Golder(2005) and to the Comparative
Political Data Set II from Armingeon and Careja (2008) 1993 is the year of the ﬁrst
election after the fall of communist rule.
 Liberia: the country has been dropped because true missing cells exceed the 50%.
 Libya: the country has been dropped because true missing cells exceed the 50%.
 Mali: true missing values from 1988 to 1990 have been replaced by missing because
of political instability due to the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré, before a coup d’etat.
 Marshall Islands: true missing from 1995-1998 have been replaced by values of the
previous (1994) and following (1999) elections which are equal.
 MyanMar : true missing from 1960 to 1963 have been replaced by missing because of
political instability. While true missing data for 1985-1987 have been complemented
by the average value from previous years.
 Nauru: true missing data from 1992 to 1994 have been replaced by the mean between
previous and following years. While true missing for 2003 has been replaced by IPU
value for election 05/2003.
 Niger: true missing value for year 1992 has been replaced by missing because of
political instability.
 Nigeria: all the true missing values have been replaced by missing because of strong
political instability and civil wars.
 Pakistan: true missing values from 1960-1972 have been replaced by missing because
of political instability and lack of constitution. While the true missing for year 1996
has been replaced by the 1995’s value, (stable data in the 90’s).
 Peru: the true missing value for year 2000 has been replaced by the observed data
from IPU (election 04-2000).
 Rwanda : true missing data from 1966-1971 have been replaced by missing because
of political instability.
43 Seychelles: true missing data for the biennium 1991-1992 have replaced by the value
belonging to year 1990, because of the historical reasons. In 1977, a coup d’état
ousted the ﬁrst president of the republic, James Mancham, who was replaced by
France Albert Ren e. The 1979 constitution declared a socialist one-party state,
which lasted until 1991. The ﬁrst draft of a new constitution failed to receive the
requisite 60 percent of voters in 1992, but an amended version was approved in 1993.
 Sierra Leone: the country has been dropped because true missing cells exceed the
50%.
 South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Vietnam: the countries have been dropped because
true missing cells exceed the 50%.
 Sri Lanka: true missing data for year 2000 has been replaced by the average between
1999 and 2001 values.
 Tonga: true missing data for 2002-2003 have been replaced by the observed value
of the election 03/2002 from IPU.
 Uganda: true missing values from 1962 to 1965 have been replaced by missing
because of political instability.
 Tanzania: true missing from 1965 to 1969 have been replaced by missing because of
political instability.
 Vanatu: true missing values for 1995-1997 have been replaced by missing because
of political instability.
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